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Abstrat. Random mathing is often used in eonomi models as a means of introduing unertainty in sequential
deision problems. We show that random mathing shemes that satisfy standard onditions on proportionality are
not unique. Hene eonomi models that use random mathing as a shok may not be well dened unless additional
onditions are imposed on the mathing sheme. Two examples show that in a simple growth model, radially dierent
optimal behavior an result from distint mathing shemes satisfying idential proportionality onditions. We give
onditions on the reward and transition strutures of sequential deision models so the models are well dened in spite
of non-uniqueness of the mathing sheme. Finally, information entropy is introdued as a method for seleting unique
mathing strutures for these models.
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hing, aggregate un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1. Introdution
Random mathing of agents plays a fundamental role in models of eonomi, soial and biologial systems. These
models often attempt to explain how interation among individuals will impat the system as a whole. Sine the
manner in whih the individuals interat depends upon how they are mathed in the rst plae, a lear understanding
of the mathing proess is essential. Important examples of the role random mathing plays in models an be found in
[18℄, [17℄, and [15℄.
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One frequent objetive in random mathing models is a deterministi model that aptures the aggregate behavior
of the agents. The early paper by Hardy and Weinberg [15℄ approximated a stohasti system with random mathing
in population genetis by a deterministi system so that the problem of omputing limiting population types beame
quite straightforward. Indeed, one of the main objetives of the extensive literature on random mathing has been
to show that it is reasonable to approximate a ompliated disrete dynamial system in whih agents are randomly
mathed by a deterministi system that is useful for omputation. The attempt to get a tratable deterministi system
has led many authors to onsider a ontinuum of interating agents. This is the impliit assumption in the paper by
Hardy and Weinberg.
In order to obtain a deterministi model, an independene ondition with respet to types is often impliitly assumed.
If the agents are of distint types, then the event that agent g is mathed to an agent of a partiular type should, in
some sense, be independent of the event that agent g˜ is mathed to an agent of a partiular type. This assumption
implies that the random bilateral mathing generates a proess of i.i.d. random variables (indexed by the set of agents
taking values in the set of types). The non-existene of measurable ontinuous time stohasti proesses of nontrivial
i.i.d. random variables is ontained in the work of Doob [9℄. Judd [16℄ elaborated on these issues for eonomists by
showing that a random mathing proess for a ontinuum of agents that satises an independene of types ondition
is not measurable with respet to the natural produt σ − algebra plaed on the produt of mathes and agents.
R. Boylan [7℄ used another approah to obtain deterministi systems through mathing models. He onstruted
speial mathing shemes for both nite and ountably innite sets of agents. His random mathing shemes satisfy
properties that make it possible to approximate stohasti dynamial systems by deterministi systems. Deterministi
systems are therefore obtained as the limit of the stohasti systems as the number of agents tends to innity.
C. Alo´s-Ferrer [4℄ showed that it is possible to onstrut random mathing models for a ontinuum of agents suh
that the probability that a given agent is mathed to an agent of a given type is proportional to the frequeny with
whih the type is present in the population. The stohasti proess he onstruts is measurable with respet to the
standard produt measure on the set of agents and the set of mathes. This proess is observable with the standard
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In the eonomis literature, random mathing appears in many subelds, inluding game theory, monetary theory, labor eonomis and
experimental eonomis. Sine many of the papers we ite in this work give exellent reviews of the use of random mathing in eonomis,
we do not repeat those surveys here.
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tools of analysis. On the other hand, his proess does not have the property that distint agents are independently
mathed with a partiular type. D. Due and Y. Sun [10℄ were able to onstrut a mathing proess that satises
an independene in types ondition. Their proess is measurable with respet to a produt σ − algebra that is larger
than the standard σ − algebra on the produt of agents and mathes, and their existene result uses methods from
nonstandard analysis.
Sine a signiant amount of work has been done that attempts to settle the foundational problems of random
mathing, it is fair to ask if the issue, at this point, is simply a tehnial one. Eonomists have a good sense of how
random mathing should work in their models, and are understandably relutant to drop a model or theory beause
the foundations might have minor tehnial diulties. We shall show how the mehanis of the random mathing
proess an have signiant impliations for eonomi models. In this sense, our ontribution omplements that of
Aliprantis, Camera, Puzzello [2, 3℄ where the anonymity properties of random mathing shemes are emphasized.
In this paper we disuss the role nonuniqueness plays in random mathing models. In setion 5 we give simple
examples of growth models that use random mathing as shok. The mathing shemes used in the examples are
idential from the point of view of the standard properties imposed on mathing in the eonomis literature. However,
in our examples, the behavior of the systems these growth models desribe are radially dierent from one another.
These examples desribe reasonable situations where the mehanis of mathing have substantive eonomi impliations,
and they an be extended in several diretions.
The fundamental problem that our examples illustrate stems from the non-uniqueness of random mathing shemes
that satisfy standard assumptions about the mathing. Sine the existene problem for random mathing is nontrivial,
[7, 4, 13, 10, 11℄, it is perhaps not surprising that the uniqueness question has not been examined up to this point.
We think that it is important to study nonuniqueness sine it improves our understanding of the workings of random
mathing systems.
Before one attempts to address the problems posed by non-uniqueness of random mathing shemes that satisfy
proportionality onditions, it is neessary to have a lear understanding of the aggregate unertainty onept for
random mathing models. An extensive disussion of aggregate unertainty for the ase of shoks that do not ome
from mathing an be found in Alo´s-Ferrer [6℄. We make the onept of no aggregate unertainty for dynami random
mathing models preise in Denition 3.5.
This paper presents two methods for dealing with the uniqueness issue. The rst method examines the relationship
between the randommathing struture and the reward and transition strutures of the models. This approah provides
suient onditions for the formulation of random mathing models with no aggregate unertainty where nonuniqueness
is no longer relevant. In some ases the model of interest may exhibit aggregate unertainty, and nonuniqueness may
be relevant. Our seond method introdues the onept of information entropy to obtain uniqueness of a random
mathing sheme.
2. Outline of Paper
We present a brief outline of the paper so that the reader an quikly see the main ideas without having to read
through the tehnial details of eah setion. If one is willing to aept some of the intermediate results, one an start
with Setion 3, and then go on to read the Setions 5, 6, and 8. One an then read the setions that disuss spei
models of dierent ardinalities for the populations, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Finally, the setion on the information entropy
of random mathing, Setion 7, an be read.
In Setion 3, Sequential Deision Problems with Random Mathing, we desribe typial lasses of eonomi models
that use random mathing as shok. The set of agents in these models an be nite, ountably innite or a ontinuum.
In this setion, we do not assume any speial ardinality for the set of agents, but desribe the three essential strutures
of these models: reward, transition, and mathing. We desribe how the mathing struture interats with the reward
struture and the transition struture, and we larify why one must be onerned with the joint measurablity of
the agent and mathing measures. We also desribe three standard assumptions that relate the type of an agent to
the random mathing, and we shall refer to them as Proportionality assumptions in this overview. We also give a
denition of aggregate unertainty for these models.
In Setion 4, Mathing Strutures and Proportionality, we desribe in more detail the methods of onstruting
random mathing shemes that satisfy the proportionality onditions. We deal with eah of the three possibilities
for the ardinality of the set of agents in separate subsetions. For eah of the three ardinalities, we show that the
set of mathing shemes that satisfy proportionality is a nonempty onvex set in some large dimensional spae (large
an mean innite). In partiular, the set of random mathing shemes that satisfy a partiular set of proportionality
onditions is far from unique. In fat, the problem of non-uniqueness beomes more diult as the ardinality of the
set of agents inreases.
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The diulties aused by non-uniqueness of random mathing shemes is desribed in Setion 5, A Growth Model
with Random Mathing. Here we present a very simple growth model, derived from a standard well known example,
that demonstrates two points.
(1) Two mathing shemes that satisfy idential proportionality onditions an give radially dierent eonomi
results.
(2) For our model, the struture of the probability distribution on the set of mathes is important to the determi-
nation of optimal poliies.
Although we use a model with a nite set of agents to demonstrate the problem, a simple modiation shows that
the probem persists if the set of agents is innite (ountable or a ontinuum). The problem is the result of the
non-uniqueness of the mathing struture and its relationship with the reward and transition strutures.
We next desribe, in Setion 6, No Aggregate Unertainty, how one an mitigate the problem aused by non-
uniqueness. We show that if the reward and transition strutures of a model depend only on the types of the agents,
then two random mathing shemes that satisfy the same proportionality onditions will give the same well dened
deterministi model. Thus unertainty will disappear in the aggregate. The results are again independent of the
ardinality of the set of agents and level of sophistiation of the mathing sheme. Although one must make fairly
strong assumptions on the reward and transition strutures, it will always be possible to use this tehnique if one is
willing to assume that the system an be desribed by a nite set of states.
Setion 7, The Entropy of a Mathing Struture, introdues a new idea to eonomi modeling with random mathing.
In some ases it will not be desirable to limit the state spae of individual agents to nite sets. For example, one might
want to allow an individual to possess any real number amount of apital up to some bound. This will make the state
spae for the individual agents unountable, and the method of dealing with non-uniqueness desribed in Setion 6
will not work. To make suh a model well dened one needs a way to single out a unique random mathing sheme
that satises the proportionality onditions. In some ases one an do this by using the information entropy of the
mathing sheme.
We nally summarize our results and indiate some future diretions for researh in Setion 8. Although random
mathing shemes are typially assumed to be exogenous, one might onsider random mathing as a ontrol variable.
Indeed this is already being done for ompliated biologial and eonomi systems. For example, ontrol of epidemis
is often linked to ontrol over a random mathing struture.
3. Sequential Deision Problems with Random Mathing
An eonomi model with random mathing of agents frequently has the struture of a sequential deision problem.
We onsider disrete time models dened over an innite time horizon. The state of the system is determined as the
aggregate of the states of the individuals that make up the population. In this setion, we take a general approah
to the problem of mathing and so the set of agents an be nite, ountably innite, or a ontinuum. We denote the
state of an individual agent at time t by s(t, g). We write s(g) to indiate the state of the agent g when the time is
understood by the ontext. Generally s(g) will be a vetor onsisting of various attributes of the agent suh as type of
good produed, apital holdings, buyer or seller, and so on. The state of the population as a whole is then desribed
by the funtion s(∗) that gives the state of eah individual. The sequential deision problem an be roughly desribed
as follows.
(1) Agents are randomly mathed and interat. The interation results in a reward (or ost) for the individual
agents. The individual rewards are determined by the state of the agent, the state of the agent's partner, and
a ontrol variable. The state of the eonomy is the aggregate of the states of individuals.
(2) After the interation or mathing of agents, the individual states of agents hange. The new states are deter-
mined as a result of the interation and hene depend upon the mathing sheme.
To make these models preise, it is neessary to desribe the reward proess, the mathing proess, and the transition
proess. There are generally two ways of seleting values for the ontrol parameter. Perhaps the simplest approah is
to stipulate that the ontrol parameter is seleted by a entral planner. Thus the interation of individual agents and
the subsequent transition to a new state is independent of deisions made by agents. The entral planner might selet
values of the ontrol to optimize total expeted reward for the entire population subjet to some set of onstraints.
Alternatively, the ontrol parameter might be seleted by a rule linked to the information available to individual agents.
In this ase individual agents selet values of the ontrol to optimize expeted individual reward.
Sine both methods of seleting ontrol values result in very ompliated stohasti dynamial systems, one tries
to simplify the model through assumptions on all three parts of the sequential model. One goal of the simplifying
assumptions is to develop a model of the aggregate eonomy that is deterministi. Hene, the simplifying assumptions
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should make it possible to obtain relationships (generally funtional equations) for quantitative measures of the ag-
gregate eonomy that depend only on the proportionality of types. The resulting model is often said to ontain no
aggregate unertainty.
We introdue some notation to make the ideas more preise. Let A denote the set of agents, with a typial agent
in A denoted by g. Assume we have a way of measuring the size of subsets of A so that we have a measure spae,
(A,L, µ). In ase µ is not a nite measure on A (e.g. A is the set of natural numbers and µ is ounting measure) one
might enounter onvergene problems. To handle this problem we assume we have an exhaustion of A by sets, An of
nite µ measure, suh that A = ∪An with An ⊂ An+1. Let Φ denote the set of bilateral mathes of agents, that is the
set of involutions of A with no xed point. Let ϕ denote a typial element of Φ. In subsequent setions, we disuss
the set Φ in detail, but for now the only additional struture we plae on Φ is a probability distribution, Q, with a
σ − algebra of subsets that we denote by F , so that (Φ,F , Q) is a probability spae.
The reward struture for the model is determined by reward funtions for the agents whih we denote by
Rg (s(g), s(ϕ(g)), u) .
The variable u is the ontrol. This notation is onsistent with our assumption that rewards for individual agents depend
only on the state of the agent, the state of the agent's partner, and the ontrol. The expeted aggregate reward for
the population for a single time period is
EQ [R (s, u)] .
A omputation of this expeted reward will involve integration (or summation) over the produt measure spae A×Φ.
We use integration with the understanding that the integral is traditionally written as a sum in the ase of disrete
distributions on disrete probability spaes. In ase the measure µ is not nite the aggregate reward over all agents
would not generally be nite, so we dene expeted reward as a limit with respet to the exhaustion of A. In ase µ
is nite the limit is not needed. The aggregate expeted reward is omputed as
(3.1) EQ [R (s, u)] = lim
n→∞
1
µ(An)
∫ ∫
An×Φ
Rg (s(g), s(ϕ(g)), u) (dµ(g)× dQ(ϕ)) .
Remark 3.1. One ould allow more ompliated reward strutures that inlude stohasti shoks independent of the
shok introdued by random mathing. We want to fous on the stohasti shok introdued by the mathing proess,
and so we do not inlude this ompliating feature in our disussion.
We next desribe the transition struture of the general model. We assume that the state of a typial agent g at
time t+ 1 is a deterministi funtion of the state of g at time t, the state the agent with whom g is mathed at time
t, and the ontrol variable u. In other words
s(t+ 1, g) = f (s(t, g), s(t, ϕ(g)), u) .
Therefore, the transition probabilities for agents are given by
ProbQ (s(t+ 1, g) |s(t, g), u ) = Q {ϕ |s(t+ 1, g) = f (s(t, g), s(t, ϕ(g)), u)} .
The transition probabilities depend expliitly on the probability distribution Q dened on Φ. The transition probabil-
ities for the entire system are the aggregates of the transition probabilities for individual agents. In terms of the state
funtion this an be written
ProbQ (s(t+ 1, ∗) |s(t, ∗), u ) = Q {ϕ |s(t+ 1, ∗) = f (s(t, ∗), s(t, ϕ(∗)), u)}
where the equality in the expression
Q {ϕ |s(t+ 1, ∗) = f (s(t, ∗), s(t, ϕ(∗)), u)}
must be regarded as equality of funtions dened on the set of agents, A.
At this point, we have desribed the general sequential deision model that uses random mathing as shok. We
have mentioned two approahes to solving a model of this type. Either a entral planner selets values of the ontrol
to optimize total expeted (disounted) rewards, or the ontrol is seleted by some rule based on states of individual
agents and information available to individual agents. (Perhaps the history of the entire system up to the present
time.) We now turn our attention to the mathing struture and the assumptions that are made in an attempt to
simplify the model.
Perhaps the most ommon assumption made about the random mathing struture involves the type of an agent.
Suppose there exists a set of types S = {τ1, τ2, τ3, · · · , τL}, and a measurable funtion
τ : A⇒ S
that assigns a type to eah agent. In general, the set of types need not be nite; however, this additional assumption
is often made, so we follow that onvention here.
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Remark 3.2. One might want to allow stohasti type funtions. For example, if agents beome buyers or sellers in a
random manner after mathing, it might be more appropriate to dene τ as a random variable. An examples of models
of this type an be found in Lagos and Wright [19℄. Here we shall restrit the disussion to the ase of a deterministi
type assignment beause we wish to onentrate on the random mathing as shok.
The type of an agent beomes a omponent of the state variable for the agent. Hene, one an write the state of the
agent at time t as
s(t, g) = (τ(t, g), k(t, g))
where we inorporate state information other than type in the state variable k(t, g). For example, in a number of
mathing models in monetary theory, agents are assigned a type based on a good produed by the agent. The agents
are also assigned an amount of money via an endowment or through a trade, prodution, and onsumption proess.
See for example the paper of Kiyotaki and Wright [18℄. As before, we shall drop the t from the notation in ase the
time period is understood by ontext.
We need a way to measure the relative size of the set of agents of various types. The relative size of the set of
agents of a given type an be omputed by exhausting the set of agents A by an inreasing sequene of subsets, An, of
nite measure, and then omputing the proportion of agents in the sets An of a given type. We say An exhausts A if
A = ∪An with An ⊂ An+1. Denote the proportion of agents in the population of type τk by Pk. Hene, we dene Pk
by
(3.2) Pk = lim
n→∞
[
µ {g ∈ An |τ(g) = τk }
µ {g ∈ An}
]
.
whenever the limit exists.
Remark 3.3. If the measure µ on the set of agents is bounded, there is no need for the limit. This is the ase for nite
sets of agents or if the set of agents is [0, 1) and µ is Lebesgue measure. In the ase A = N , there is a natural hoie
for the sequene of exhausting sets; let An = {1, 2, 3, · · · , n}, with µ the ounting measure.
The desire for a deterministi model with mathing leads to a set of assumptions on the mathing proess. Eah
math should preserve the measure of sets of agents. Next, the probability that a given agent is mathed to an agent of
some type should equal the proportion of agents of that type in the population. Finally, for eah math, the proportion
of agents of a given type that are mathed to a seond type should equal the produt of the proportions of the two
types in the population. We formalize this with the following set of three random mathing properties related to types.
We follow the labels used by Alo´s-Ferrer in [5℄ here.
Denition 3.4. Suppose the proportions Pk are dened by equation 3.2 for an exhaustion of A by An. The random
mathing sheme dened by (A,L, µ) and (Φ,F , Q), satises the Proportionality Laws if the following onditions are
satised.
M1. Measure Preserving µ(E) = µ(ϕ(E)) for all measurable E for ϕ
M2. Proportional Law Q {ϕ |τ(ϕ(g)) = τl } = Pl for a.e. g ∈ A
M3. Quasi-independene limn→∞ µ {g ∈ An |τ(g) = τi and τ(ϕ(g)) = τj } /µ (An)
= PiPj for a.e. ϕ ∈ Φ
Note that in the ase that µ(A) is nite, there is no need for the limit in property M3.2
We an now make the onept of aggregate unertainty for the dynami random mathing model preise. This
onept has a long history in the eonomis literature, and several methods have been proposed to onstrut models
that exhibit the no aggregate unertainty property. See for example [16℄.
Denition 3.5. The reward struture of the model ontains no aggregate unertainty if
EQ [R (s, u)] = E eQ [R (s, u)]
whenever Q and Q˜ satisfy the same Proportionality Laws. Similarly, the transition struture of the model ontains no
aggregate unertainty if
ProbQ (s(t+ 1, ∗) |s(t, ∗), u) = Prob eQ (s(t+ 1, ∗) |s(t, ∗), u )
whenever Q and Q˜ satisfy the same Proportionality Laws. If both of these onditions are satised, we say the model
ontains no aggregate unertainty.
2
Alo´s-Ferrer refers to property M3 as the Mixing Property. We prefer a dierent term sine mixing ould be onfused with a uniform
dispersal of agents among types. The produt nature of the property seems loser to the idea of independent events to us.
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The above denition of no aggregate unertainty implies that for models that satisfy this ondition, the aggregate
expeted reward an be omputed in terms of the proportionality onstants Pi. Hene our denition is onsistent with
the onept of no aggregate unertainty in ase random shoks are applied to individual agents (without mathing).
We next disuss the mathing struture of these models in more detail. We onsider eah of the three possibilities for
the ardinality of the set of agents, and show why non-uniqueness of the mathing sheme ours in eah ase.
4. Mathing Strutures and Proportionality
Reall that the set of mathes, Φ, is the set of involutions dened on the set of agents suh that no agent is mathed
with herself. So if ϕ ∈ Φ then ϕ is a bijetion, ϕ(ϕ(g)) = g, and ϕ(g) 6= g. A random mathing struture is a
probability spae with Φ as the set of elements of the spae, and we denote this spae by (Φ,F , Q).
In this setion, we disuss the existene and non-uniqueness of probability distributions on Φ that satisfy the three
onditions M1, M2, and M3 of Denition 3.4. Most of the work that has been done in trying to establish rigorous
foundations for mathing models have foused on the existene question. It does not seem to be widely known that
one an onstrut random mathing strutures for nite sets of agents that will satisfy the Proportionality Laws. In
partiular, this makes it possible to onstrut mathing models with nitely many agents that exhibit the no aggregate
unertainty ondition. We expet that the onstrution below will also be useful in experimental eonomis sine one
must work with nite sets of agents. Some examples may be found in [8, 12℄.
4.1. Mathing for Finite Sets of Agents. Take as the set of agents, A = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N}, with N = 2n. We an
represent any bilateral math, ϕ, as follows. Write
ϕ ∼ (a11, a12)(a21, a22) · · · (an1, an2)
to mean that ϕ(ai1) = ai2 and ϕ(ai2) = ai1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In other words, ai1 and ai2 are mathed.
We further order the pairs so that the following inequalities hold.
a11 < a21 < · · · < an1,
aj1 < aj2.
We shall refer to this ordering on the pairs as the lexiographi ordering, and it makes the representation unique. It
also gives us an easy way to ount the number of elements in the set, Φ, of involutions. We denote this number by
m(2n) and we have
m(2n) = ardΦ = (2n− 1)(2n− 3)(2n− 5) · · · (3)(1).
This follows by noting that we must have a11 = 1 and that there are 2n − 1 hoies for a12. Reursively apply this
observation until the set A is exhausted to get the result.
It will be onvenient to have an alternate expression for the number of involutions when we disuss probability
distributions on the set Φ. If we selet the elements for mathing two at a time and note that the order in whih we
selet pairs is unimportant, then we immediately have
m(2n) = ardΦ =
(
2n
2
)(
2n− 2
2
)
· · ·
(
2
2
)
n!
.
Here we use the notation,
(
p
q
)
= p!/(q!(p− q)!) for p hoose q.
Additional properties of involutions, bilateral mathing, and equivalent ounting arguments are disussed in [1, 2, 17℄.
We now desribe probability distributions on Φ that satisfy the onditions M1, M2 and M3.
Theorem 4.1. Let S = {τ1, τ2, ..., τL} be a nite set of types and let P1, P2, ..., PL be positive rational numbers with∑
Pi = 1. Then there exists a nite set of agents, A, a type assignment, τ : A → S, and a probability distribution Q
on the set of bilateral mathes, Φ, of A suh that the following onditions hold with µ the ounting measure on A.
(i) The proportion of agents of type τl equals Pl, so µ {g |τ(g) = τl } /µ(A) = Pl;
(ii) Q {ϕ ∈ Φ |τ(ϕ(g)) = τl } = Pl for all g ∈ A;
(iii) µ {g |τ(g) = τi and τ(ϕ(g)) = τj } /µ(A) = PiPj for a.e. ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof. Write Pl = pl/ql where pl and ql are integers, and the quotients Pl are in redued form. The set A will onsist
of a total of N = 2q1q2 · · · qL agents. We shall dene a subset Ψ ⊂ Φ of bilateral mathes having a speial form. The
number of agents of types τl will be nl = 2plq1q2 · · · qˇl · · · qL where the qˇl indiates that ql is not present in the produt.
Sine
∑
Pl = 1 we have
(4.1) 2p1q2q3 · · · qL + · · ·+ 2pLq1q2 · · · qL−1 = 2q1q2 · · · qL
and the total number of agents equals the sum of the number of agents of eah type.
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To make it easier to keep trak of types, we label our agents with a subsript and a supersript with the supersript
indiating type. Denote an agent of type τl by g
l
∗ where ∗ runs from 1 through nl. Now eah math, ϕ ∈ Ψ, will math
the agents as follows. Eah ϕ will math ul agents of type τl to agents of type τl and will math vij agents of type τi
to agents of type τj where i 6= j. So for example the number of agents of type τ1 mathed to agents of type τ1 will
equal u1, and the number of type τ1 agents mathed to type τ2 agents is v12. For instane, if there are two types, a
typial math an be denoted as
g1∗g
1
∗ · · · g
1
∗g
2
∗ · · · g
2
∗g
1
∗g
1
∗ · · · g
1
∗
g1∗g
1
∗ · · · g
1
∗g
2
∗ · · · g
2
∗g
2
∗g
2
∗ · · · g
2
∗
where the agents in the rst row are mathed to the orresponding agent in the seond row.
We assign the following values to the numbers ul and vij for i 6= j. Let
ul =
pl
ql
(nl) =
pl
ql
(2plq1q2 · · · qˇl · · · qL)
vij =
pj
qj
(2piq1q2 · · · qˇi · · · qL) =
= 2pipjq1q2 · · · qˇi · · · qˇj · · · qL
=
pi
qi
pj
qj
2q1q2q3 · · · qL
=
pi
qi
pj
qj
N
The numbers vij are learly integers and from equation 4.1 it follows that ul is an even integer. It is also lear from
the expression for vij that vij is symmetri in i and j as required. From the last expression for vij we also see that the
proportion of agents of type τi that are mathed with agents of type τj equals PiPj . Hene we obtain property (iii) of
the theorem with these hoies.
It is easy to ompute the total number of mathes in the set Ψ desribed above. First let m(k) denote the total
number of bilateral mathes of k agents as before. Then the total number of distint mathes of the above form,
denoted M (P1, P2, ..., PL), is given by
M (P1, P2, ..., PL) = ard Ψ =(
n1
u1
)(
n1 − u1
v12
)(
n1 − u1 − v12
v13
)
· · ·
(
n1 − u1 − ...− v1,L−1
v1L
)
· · ·
· · ·
(
nL
uL
)(
nL − uL
vL1
)
. . .
(
nL − ...− vL,L−2
vL,L−1
)∏
l
m(ul)
∏
i<j
vij !
We assign equal probability to eah math in Ψ. In other words, we put the uniform disrete distribution, Q, on the
set Ψ of bilateral mathes we have desribed above. The distribution Q has the property given in statement (ii) of
the theorem. To see this let g∗∗ denote any agent. For example, onsider agent g
1
1 . The probability that this agent is
mathed to an agent of type τ1 equals the number of mathes in whih g
1
1 is mathed to a type τ1 agent divided by the
total number of mathes. But this is exatly equal to the proportion of the agents seleted to be mathed to type τ1
agents, or in other words, P1 as desired. Similarly, the probability that agent g
1
1 is mathed to a type τi agent equals
the proportion of type τ1 agents seleted to be mathed with type τi agents or Pi. 
Example 4.2. An example will help explain the above onstrution and ounting argument. Suppose we want to
onstrut a mathing model with two types and the property that the probability that any given agent be mathed
with an agent of either type equal 1/2. Then P1 = P2 = 1/2. The number of agents we need is
ard A = 2q1q2 = 2(2)(2) = 8
with 4 agents of eah type. We denote the types as a and b to make the notation a bit leaner in this example. We
math the agents as follows.
a∗ a∗ a∗ b∗
a∗ b∗ b∗ b∗
where the ∗ subsripts range from 1 through 4. Agents in the top row are mathed with the orresponding agent in
the seond row. There are
(
4
2
)
(4 hoose 2) ways to selet the a agents to be mathed to a agents. One these two
a agents are seleted, the remaining 2 type a agents must be mathed to b agents. Similarly, there are
(
4
2
)
ways to
selet the b agents to be mathed with b agents. One the pairs of agents of eah type are seleted, there are 2! ways to
math the type a agents with the type b agents. (In this simple example we do not have the additional ompliation
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of ounting the ways to math the a agents with the a agents sine there are only two of them and hene only one way
to math them.) Thus there are (
4
2
)(
2
2
)(
4
2
)(
2
2
)
2! = 72
mathes of this form. We assign probability 1/72 to eah of the mathes. The probability that any given agent, for
example agent a1, will be mathed to a type a agent is 1/2 and the probability that a1 will be mathed to a type b
agent is 1/2. For eah math of the 72 mathes, exatly two of the type a agents are mathed to type a agents sine
two of the type a agents are mathed to one another. Also, exatly two of the type a agents are mathed to type b
agents. Hene, onditions M2 and M3 are satised. In this ase M1 is trivial, so the Proportionality Laws hold.
The above probability distribution is not unique in the sense that there are other probability distributions on the
set of all mathes of the 8 agents suh that the Proportionality Laws are satised. In fat, we need only two mathes,
eah equally likely, to aomplish this. Let
ϕ1 = (a1, a2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4)(b1, b2)
ϕ2 = (a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, a4)(b3, b4)
and assign probability 1/2 to eah of these two mathes and probability 0 to all other bilateral mathes of the 8 agents.
It is easy to see that the probability that any given agent be mathed to an agent of either type equals 1/2 just as
before. The quasi-independene property is also obvious.
If Q and Q˜ satisfy onditions M2 and M3, then any onvex ombination of Q and Q˜ will satisfy M2 and M3. In
the ase of nitely many agents with the ounting measure on the set of agents, M1 holds trivially. Hene, the set of
probability distributions, Q, suh that the Proportionality Laws hold (with ounting measure on the set of agents) is
a onvex polyhedra with nonempty relative interior. So the distributions that satisfy the Proportionality Laws are far
from unique.
4.2. Countably Innite Sets of Agents. Let Φ denote the set of all involutions without xed point of N, the natural
numbers. As in the nite ase, every element ϕ of Φ has a unique representation as an innite sequene of pairs of
natural numbers.
(a11, a12), (a21, a22), (a31, a32), · · · , (aj1, aj2), (aj+1,1, aj+1,2), · · ·
where the pairs of natural numbers satisfy the onditions
(4.2) a11 < a21 < a31 < · · ·
(4.3) aj1 < aj2 for all j
and the set of all aji exhausts N. The relationship between the sequene and the involution ϕ is
ϕ(ak1) = ak2
for all k as in the nite ase. It will be onvenient to have a formal name for this representation.
Denition 4.3. Let ϕ be a bilateral math of either a nite set {1, 2, ..., 2n} or of the natural numbers N. The
representation of ϕ by the sequene (nite or innite) of pairs
(a11, a12)(a21, a22)(a31, a32) · · · (aj1, aj2)(aj+1,1, aj+1,2) · · ·
satisfying onditions (4.2) and (4.3) is the lexiographi representation of ϕ.
It follows immediately from the denition that the lexiographi representation is unique. We use the above rep-
resentation to show that Φ is unountable by using a Cantor diagonalization argument. We rst give a preliminary
result on the lexiographi representation of involutions.
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ = (a11, a12)(a21, a22)(a31, a32) · · · (aj1, aj2)(aj+1,1, aj+1,2) · · · be any involution of N written as the
unique pairwise representation. Then a11 = 1 and for k > 1,
ak1 = inf{a11, a12, · · · , ak−1,1, ak−1,2}
c.
where {}c denotes the omplement in N.
Proof. The result follows diretly from the denition of the lexiographi order. 
Theorem 4.5. The set of involutions of the natural numbers is unountable.
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Proof. Let F : N→ Φ be any injetion from N into the set of involutions of A. (We use A to denote the set of agents
sine we use N to index mathes in the ounting argument.) We want to show that F annot be onto, and to do this
we use the standard diagonalization argument together with the above unique representation of an involution. Let
ϕn = F (n) and write ϕn in the unique pairwise representation given above.
ϕn = (a
n
11, a
n
12)(a
n
21, a
n
22) · · ·
We shall dene an involution in unique pairwise representation form that diers from eah of the n involutions in the
nth plae. This diagonalization then implies that the set of involutions is unountable.
Let ψ be the math ψ = (b11, b12)(b21, b22) · · · (bk1, bk2) · · · , with the bkl to be dened. We put b11 = 1. Put
b12 = inf{b11, a
1
12}
c
. So for example if a112 6= 2 then we must have b12 = 2. Now dene bk1 reursively by
(4.4) bk1 = inf{b11, b12, b21, b22, · · · , bk−1,1, bk−1,2}
c
(4.5) bk2 = inf{n : n > bk1 and n ∈ {b11, b12, b21, b22, · · · , bk−1,1, bk−1,2, a
k
k2}
c}.
Note that (4.4) must be satised if we use the unique pairwise representation for ψ, and the denition of bk2 fores
the kth pair in the representation of ψ to dier from the kth pair in the representation of ϕk. Sine the k
th
pair of
the representation of ψ diers from the kth pair of the representation of ϕk, the involution ψ diers from every ϕk.
Therefore the map F annot be onto and the result follows. 
Remark 4.6. The un-ountability of the set of bilateral mathes of N is impliit in the work of Boylan [7℄ sine he
onstruts unique bilateral mathes from sequenes of i.i.d. random variables with values in a nite set of more than
one element. The ardinality of the set of suh sequenes is unountable.
We are interested in desribing distributions on the set of involutions. The above result together with the Continuum
Hypothesis, tells us that the set of involutions of N an be identied with the unit interval of real numbers. However,
if we wish to use properties of standard ontinuous distributions on the interval, we need a preise desription of the
identiation. Fortunately, the unique pairwise representation gives an easy way to do this. We rst write Φ as a
sequene of disjoint unions. Let
Φn = {(1, n+ 1)(∗, ∗) · · · }
be the involutions with (1, n+ 1) as the rst pair in the representation. The sets Φn are disjoint and the union of the
Φn gives us Φ. Next, deompose eah Φn into a disjoint union,
Φi1 = ∪Φi1n
with
Φi1n = {(1, i1)(a21, a22) · · · }
where a21 is uniquely dened by the value of i1 and Lemma 4.4. The smallest possible value of a22 orresponds to
n = 1 and so on. Continue in this manner, and reursively dene disjoint sets of involutions Φi1i2i3···ik . For instane,
Φ1 = {(1, 2)...} Φ11 = {(1, 2)(3, 4)...}, Φ12 = {(1, 2)(3, 5)...}, and so on.
We ollet the properties of these sets in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. The sets Φi1i2i3···ik satisfy the following onditions.
(1) If Φi1i2i3···ik = {(a11,a12)(a21, a22) · · · (ak1, ak2) · · · } where the aij appearing in the rst k pairs are xed by
the reursive denition, then
Φi1i2i3···ikn =
{
(a11,a12)(a21, a22) · · · (ak1, ak2)(a(k+1)1, bn) · · ·
}
where a(k+1)1 is uniquely dened by Lemma 4.4 and bn denotes the n
th
smallest possible value for the seond
element of the (k + 1)st pair.
(2) Φi1 ⊃ Φi1i2 ⊃ Φi1i2i3 ⊃ · · ·
(3) For xed k, the sets Φi1i2i3···ik are disjoint.
(4) For xed k, ∪Φi1i2i3···ik = Φ.
(5) For eah ϕ ∈ Φ there exists a unique sequene of sets Φi1 ⊃ Φi1i2 ⊃ Φi1i2i3 ⊃ · · · with
{ϕ} = Φi1 ∩ Φi1i2 ∩ Φi1i2i3 ∩ · · ·
Proof. The rst property is just the formal restatement of the reursive denition of the sets. The seond property
follows diretly from the rst. The third property follows sine two involutions that dier somewhere in the rst k
pairs are distint. The fourth property holds sine we list all possible sequenes of pairs of length k in the denition of
Φi1i2i3···ik . Finally, suppose ϕ = (a11,a12)(a21, a22) · · · (ak1, ak2) · · · . By the onstrution of the sets Φi1i2i3···ik , there
exists exatly one set Φi1 ontaining ϕ. Next, there exists exatly (disjoint property) one subset, Φi1i2 ⊂ Φi1ontaining
ϕ. Continue in this manner to generate the sequene of nested sets Φi1i2i3···ik eah of whih ontains ϕ. Suppose there
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exists an involution ψ 6= ϕ in the intersetion. Then the representation of ψ must dier from the representation of ϕ.
If they dier at the kth pair, then ϕ and ψ annot be ontained in the same set Φi1i2i3···ik . 
With the above deomposition of Φ, we are ready to dene a one to one and onto map from Φ to the half open unit
interval I = [0, 1). We dene a deomposition of [0, 1) into disjoint nested subintervals that orrespond to the sets
Φi1i2i3···ik . First for n = 1, 2, 3, · · · put
In =
[
n− 1
n
,
n
n+ 1
)
.
This gives [0, 1) as a disjoint union of half open subintervals. Now suppose we have reursively dened half open
subintervals Ii1i2i3···ik satisfying properties (2), (3), and (4) of Lemma 4.7 with I replaing Φ. Let
Ii1i2i3···ik = [a, b)
denote one of these subintervals. We deompose Ii1i2i3···ik = [a, b) into a disjoint union of subintervals as follows. Let
Ii1i2i3···ikn =
[
a+
n− 1
n
(b− a), a+
n
n+ 1
(b − a)
)
These half open intervals are disjoint and
∪nIi1i2i3···ikn = Ii1i2i3···ik .
Lemma 4.8. For eah x ∈ [0, 1), there is a unique sequene of half open intervals
Ii1 ⊃ Ii1i2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ii1i2i3···ik ⊃ · · ·
suh that
{x} = Ii1 ∩ Ii1i2 ∩ · · · ∩ Ii1i2i3···ik · · ·
Proof. By the onstrution of the disjoint sets Ii1i2i3···ik there is a unique Ii1 ontaining x. There is now a unique
Ii1i2 ⊂ Ii1 ontaining x. Continue in this manner to generate the unique sequene of sets. The intersetion of the
intervals ontains x. If the intersetion ontains a seond point, y, then there exists an ε > 0 with |x− y| > ε. But
sine the length of the half open subintervals Ii1i2i3···ik tends to 0 this is impossible. 
Finally, with the above results we are able to identify the set Φ of bilateral mathings of the natural numbers with
the half open interval [0, 1). This identiation will allow us to be preise in our disussion of probability distributions
on the set of involutions.
Theorem 4.9. Let ϕ ∈ Φ with representation
(a11, a12)(a21, a22)(a31, a32) · · · (aj1, aj2)(aj+1,1, aj+1,2) · · ·
Let the sequene (i1, i2, i3, · · · ) be the unique sequene of natural numbers assoiated with ϕ by Lemma 4.7 so that
{ϕ} = Φi1 ∩ Φi1i2 ∩ Φi1i2i3 ∩ · · ·
Let x ∈ [0, 1) with
{x} = Ii1 ∩ Ii1i2 ∩ · · · ∩ Ii1i2i3···ik · · · .
Then the map F (ϕ) = x is a bijetion.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the onstrution of the unique representations of ϕ and x given in Lemma
4.7 and Lemma 4.8. 
When we disuss the problem of uniqueness for probability distributions on the set of bilateral mathes in the
ountably innite ase, it will be more onvenient to have a slightly dierent representation of the set of bilateral
mathes of the natural numbers. The following orollary is obtained by mapping the half open interval [0, 1) onto
[0,∞) by the map x→ x/(1− x).
Corollary 4.10. There exists a bijetion from the set Φ of bilateral mathes of the natural numbers N to the half open
interval [0,∞).
For a ountable innite set of agents modeled as N we now have a good desription of the set Φ of bilateral mathes.
The next step is the onstrution of probability distributions on this set that satisfy the onditions M1, M2, and M3.
Boylan [7℄ proved the existene of a probability distribution on Φ that satises these properties. In this ase property
M1 is trivial if we take µ to be the ounting measure on N. Of ourse this is not a nite measure and therefore we need
the limit in property M3. In his existene result, Boylan uses the Cesaro average to dene the proportion of agents of
a partiular type. This is equivalent to exhausting the set N by the sets {1, 2, 3, · · · , n}.
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It is easy to see that the probability distribution onstruted by Boylan on Φ that satises onditions M1, M2, and
M3 is not unique. We reall just enough of his onstrution to explain the non-uniqueness.
Let S = {τ1, τ2, ..., τL} be a nite set of types. Let µ be the ounting measure on N. Exhaust N by sets An =
{1, 2, 3, · · · , n}. Assume the proportion of eah type, τl, in the population is Pl as dened by equation 3.2. Let τ be the
type assignment map. Let Xi be i.i.d. random variables (indexed by the agents) taking values in S with distribution
given by the Pi. In other words,
Prob (X∗ = τl) = Pl.
The value of Xl will tell us the type of the agent to be mathed with agent l. So, math agent 1 with agent k where
k = inf {j |X1 = τ(j) and Xj = τ(1)} .
Continue to math the remaining unmathed agents in the same manner.
This denes a probability distribution on the set of all bilateral mathes of N that satises the Proportionality Laws.
Furthermore every set of bilateral mathes of the form,
{ϕ |ϕ = (a11,a12)(a21, a22) · · · (ak1, ak2) · · · }
where the rst k pairs are speied and the remaining (innitely many) pairs are unspeied, has positive probability.
This probability tends to zero as the number of speied pairs, k, tends to innity. One an use these properties and
the bijetion dened in Corollary 4.10, to identify this distribution with a ontinuous distribution on [0,∞).
It is easy to see that this distribution is not unique. To onstrut a seond distribution that satises the Propor-
tionality Laws, simply interhange two (or more) agents of the same type and reapply the proedure. For example,
assume there are two types of equal proportion. Suppose agents 1, 2 and agent 1000 have the same type. Assume there
are many agents of eah type from 3 through 999. Swith agent 2 and agent 1000. This will not hange the proportion
of agents of eah type in the population. With the original order, it is muh more likely that agent 1 will be mathed
with agent 2 than with agent 1000. But with the seond order, this is reversed. Hene we have a dierent distribution.
The set of probability distributions on Φ, the set of bilateral mathes of N, that satisfy mathing properties M1, M2,
and M3 form a onvex set in the set of all probability distributions on Φ. There does not appear to be any natural
way to selet one over another. We shall disuss the onsequenes of this fat below and give one possible approah to
seleting a distinguished probability distribution.
Finally, we mention that the results of the previous setion on random mathing distributions for nite sets of agents
an be used to onstrut probability distributions for ountably innite sets of agents. Suppose our (ountable innite)
populations onsists of nitely many types and the proportion of eah type is a rational number. Find a random
mathing sheme on a nite set of agents that satises the properties M1, M2, and M3. Suh a sheme exists by the
results of the previous setion. Now regroup the agents of the innite ountable population into a ountable number
of subgroups, eah one of whih is a opy of this nite set. Randomly math the agents in the innite population by
randomly mathing the agents in eah subgroup. The random mathing sheme on the innite population inherits the
properties from the mathing sheme on the nite set of agents.
The above onstrution should make lear the problem one faes when onstruting mathing shemes satisfying
the onditions M1, M2, and M3. The reader might, at this point, antiipate that the same onstrution is possible in
the ase of a ontinuum of agents.
4.3. Random Mathing for a Continuum of Agents. We now onsider the ase of a ontinuum of agents. The
set of agents is perhaps most frequently modeled as the unit interval [0, 1] or the half open interval [0, 1). It is also
frequently assumed that subsets of agents are measured using Lebesgue measure on the interval. This makes it easy
to make sense of the onept of the proportion of agents of a given type. The unit interval model ould of ourse
be replaed with any other model with the ardinality of the reals, R. For example, if one used the innite half open
interval, [0,∞), with a non-nite measure, then one ould make sense of proportionality as a limit. Whihever model
one uses, it is important to keep in mind that the real number identifying an agent is simply a name or label for the
agent. If one uses a dierent name or label, the behavior of the model should not hange. We will use the [0, 1) model
in our disussion here.
A random mathing sheme for the set of agents, [0, 1), requires a distribution on the set of involutions of [0, 1).
As before, we assume the involutions have no xed point so that every agent is mathed. Let S = {τ1, τ2, τ3, · · · , τL}
be a nite set of types and assume that eah agent is assigned a type. Suppose the proportion of agents of type τk
equals Pk as before. For this model, Alo´s-Ferrer [4℄ onstruts a probability distribution on the bilateral mathes that
satises the properties M1, M2, and M3. Just as in the ase of a ountably innite number of agents, this probability
distribution is not unique. Although the same basi idea that we used in the ountable innite ase an be used to
understand the non-uniqueness, we present a seond method.
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Consider two opies of the unit interval as the set of agents. In other words, we just have two idential opies of a
ontinuum of agents with eah agent assigned a type, and the proportion of agents of eah type is idential in the two
opies. Construt random mathing shemes that satisfy M1, M2, and M3 on eah opy separately. Now shrink eah
opy down by some fator. Glue the two opies together to make an interval of length one. The proportions of agents
of eah type on the two parts equals the original proportions. Apply the random mathing sheme on eah part. In
this way we get a new probability distribution sine we have hanged the set of involutions. We provide the details
below.
Let Q be a probability distribution on some subset Ψ of the set Φ of all bilateral mathes of the agent set [0, 1).
Let ϕ ∈ Ψ denote a typial bilateral math. Assume the distribution Q satises the onditions M1, M2, and M3. Fix
some α ∈ (0, 1). For eah ϕ ∈ Ψ dene a new bilateral math as follows.
ϕ˜(x) =
{
αϕ( x
α
) if 0 ≤ x < α
α+ (1− α)ϕ(x−α1−α ) if α ≤ x < 1
We have dened a new set of bilateral mathes Ψ˜ and a bijetion with the original set of mathes Ψ. Dene a σ-
algebra on Ψ˜ using the bijetion of mathes. Dene a probability distribution on the sets in the σ- algebra of subsets of
Ψ˜ by Q˜(E˜) = Q(E) if E and E˜ orrespond to one another under the bijetion of mathes. Sine the shrinking funtion
x→ αx does not hange the proportion of agents of a given type, Q˜ will also satisfy properties M1, M2, and M3. But
we now have two distint probability distributions (in fat a one parameter family) of distributions on the set of all
bilateral mathes of [0, 1). Note that the mathing sheme we onstruted by the glueing proess has the property that
agents in the rst interval [0, α) are never mathed with agents in the seond interval [α, 1).
The above onstrution an be applied to any random mathing sheme for a ontinuum of agents. Hene, the
standard onditions M1, M2, and M3 are not enough to isolate a single mathing sheme in the set of bilateral mathes
of a ontinuum of agents.
Remark 4.11. The ardinality of the set of mappings R⇒ R is known as i2 (Beth 2). It is fairly straightforward to
show that this is the ardinality of the set of bilateral mathes of a ontinuum of agents as well. The general ontinuum
hypothesis says that ℵ2 =i2. So the set of bilateral mathes of a ontinuum of agents is indeed a very large set.
Therefore the nonuniqueness problem for bilateral mathes of a ontinuum of agents seems to be muh less tratable
than non-uniquness for bilateral mathes of a ountable set of agents.
We nally mention that the random mathing sheme we onstruted on the nite set of agents an be used to
onstrut a mathing sheme on the ontinuum of agents [0, 1). Let g denote an agent in a nite set of agents A˜
for whih we have onstruted a mathing sheme satisfying M1, M2, and M3. Suppose ard(A˜) = N . Let G be
a half open interval of agents of length 1/N with all of the same type as agent g. We now have a ontinuum of
agents with the same proportion of agents of eah type (using Lebesgue measure to measure proportion) as the nite
set. Now randomly math the agents in the ontinuum by mathing the intervals (whih all have the same length)
aording to the probability law used to math the agents in the nite set. An interval of length 1/N is mapped onto
a seond interval of length 1/N in the obvious way. This mathing sheme on the ontinuum of agents satises the
Proportionality Laws M1, M2, and M3.
4.4. Summary. For eah of the three possibilities for the ardinality of the set of agents in the population, we have
shown that the probability distributions, Q, that satisfy the Proportionality Laws (for a xed measure, µ, on the set
of agents) are not unique. In fat the set of suh distributions is a onvex set in a large dimensional spae (innite
dimensional if A is innite). In the ase A is innite, the non-uniqueness is more diult to quantify sine the set of
bilateral mathes is ℵ1 or ℵ2 (assuming the general ontinuum hypothesis).
If random mathing is used in an eonomi model, and one only knows that the mathing sheme satises the
Proportionality Laws, the non-uniqueness may make it impossible to ompute even fundamental quantities suh as
transition probabilities and expeted rewards. The next setion shows this problem an be serious.
5. A Growth Model with Random Mathing
In the last setion we showed that random mathing shemes that satisfy proportionality laws are far from unique.
In partiular, we showed how to onstrut a multipliity of random mathing strutures that satisfy assumptions M1,
M2, and M3 for agents sets of nite, ountable, or a ontinuum ardinality. In this setion we present an example that
shows the non-uniqueness of the mathing sheme an present a serious problem for eonomi models. The example
an be easily modied to demonstrate that the same problem persists in the ase of innitely many agents (ountable
or unountable). We show that in a modied version of a basi stohasti growth model (e.g., [21℄), the mehanis
of random mathing have substantive impliations for the evolution of the growth model as well as optimality and
equilibrium.
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First reall a very simple growth model that inorporates a stohasti shok. Suppose prodution of a good ours
during disrete time periods. Let k(t) denote apital available at epoh t, or the start of period t. Let prodution
during period t be denoted by F (k(t)) and let c(t) be the fration, between 0 and 1, of prodution that is onsumed.
Let z(t) denote a stohasti shok, so we may think of the z(t) as i.i.d. random variables with values in the unit interval
[0, 1]. The updating rule for apital is given by
k(t+ 1) = k(t) + z(t)F (k(t))− c(t)z(t)F (k(t)).
This model is similar to one desribed in [21℄. We express onsumption in relative rather than absolute terms sine it
will be easier to explain how distint mathing distributions result in distint outomes by using a relative expression
for onsumption. In this model, one may think of the shok, z(t), as a result of natural or man made disasters,
tehnology hanges, or some other unpreditable fator.
We now modify the above example to desribe an eonomy with a nite number agents suh that the updating rule
for the apital involves a shok that is the result of random mathing of the agents. Again we onsider a disrete time
model over an innite time horizon.
Suppose our eonomy onsists of an even number, 2N , of agents of two types, a and b. Denote the set of agents
by
A = {a1, ..., aN , b1, ..., bN}
Suppose the two types of agents use omplementary resoures to produe a good. Assume prodution ours only when
agents of dierent types are mathed. We use ommon normalized units to measure resoures, prodution, and the
good that is onsumed. Prodution and onsumption our during disrete time periods, and a planner's optimization
problem is to maximize total disounted utility of onsumption for the entire set of agents over the innite time horizon.
The state of the eonomy at the start of period t is given by the vetor of resoures available to the agents whih
we denote by
k(t) = (ka1(t), ka2(t), ..., kaN (t), kb1 (t), ..., kbN (t)).
Let kg(t) denote a typial omponent of this state vetor where the subsript indiates the agent. We assume kg(t) to
be nonnegative. At the beginning of eah period, the state vetor, k(t), is observed. A planner selets a fration of the
potential prodution to be onsumed for the period for eah agent. Denote this fration by the onsumption vetor,
c(t), with a typial omponent denoted cg(t) for agent g. Hene the atual onsumption of a given agent will be the
produt of cg(t) and the prodution amount. After k(t) is observed and c(t) is seleted, agents are randomly bilaterally
mathed. As before, let Φ denote the set of all possible bilateral mathes of these 2N agents. The randomness for
mathing is taken are of by plaing a probability distribution on the set of mathes. If Q denotes a probability
distribution on Φ, then Q(ϕ) denotes the probability of math ϕ. Let Fg(k(t), ϕ) denote the prodution amount of
agent g. This prodution amount will depend upon an agent's apital at epoh t and the apital of the agent with
whom agent g is mathed. Hene the arguments of Fg are k(t) and ϕ. The updating rule for agent g given the math
ϕ is
kg(t+ 1) = kg(t) + Fg(k(t), ϕ) − cg(t)Fg(k(t), ϕ).
We now desribe the prodution funtion Fg(k(t), ϕ). Sine agents possess omplementary resoures, prodution
ours only when agents of opposite type meet through the math ϕ. A simple and reasonable hoie for Fg is
Fg(k(t), ϕ) =
{
f
(
min[kg(t), kϕ(g)(t)]
)
if g and ϕ(g) have dierent types
0 if g and ϕ(g) have the same type
.
Here f denotes a bounded inreasing ontinuous funtion with f(0) = 0. Sine the math ϕ is hosen randomly from
some given distribution, our model inorporates a random shok just as in the simple growth model.
Suppose now that our planner wishes to optimize total disounted utility of onsumption over an innite time
horizon with disount fator β. A poliy for the planner will be a map from the information sets {k(s) : s ≤ t} to the
set of possible onsumption vetors c(t). For sequential deision problems of the type we are onsidering, a stationary
optimal poliy exists, so we may assume that c(t) depends only on the urrent state of the eonomy, k(t). We rst
write down an expression for the total disounted utility of onsumption.
Let u denote a utility funtion for onsumption of an individual agent. Let pi denote a stationary poliy. Then the
sequene of state vetors, k(t) will be a Markov proess. The total disounted expeted utility of onsumption for the
poliy pi is given by
Vpi = Epi
[∑
t
βt
(∑
g
u (cg(t)Fg (k(t), ∗))
)]
.
The expetation depends on the poliy pi sine the Markov proess of state vetors depends on pi. Expetation also
depends on the random mathing distribution.
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This type of optimization problem an be solved by using the assoiated Bellman equation,
V (k) = max
c
(
R(k, c) + β
∑
Pkk˜(c)V (k˜)
)
.
Here R(k, c) is the expeted reward for a single period given the initial state vetor k = (ka1 , ..., kbN ) and onsumption
vetor c = (ca1 , ..., cbN ). The Pkk˜(c) are the transition probabilities from state vetor k to state vetor k˜ under the
hoie c of onsumption vetor for the agents during the period. Both expeted reward and the transition probabilities
depend on the random mathing distribution.
Suppose we know the distribution of resoures at the start of a period. For example, suppose both type a agents
and type b agents both have 0 or 1 unit of resoure, eah with probability .5. Suppose also that the probability that
any given agent meets a type a agent is .5 and the probability that she meets a type b agent is also .5. One might
be tempted to ompute the expeted reward for the rst period using the following argument.
An individual agent will produe only if she has 1 unit of resoure, she meets an agent of opposite type,
and the agent she meets also has 1 unit of resoure. Sine eah of these events our with probability
.5 and they our independently, prodution ours with probability (.5)(.5)(.5). If these events our,
then the prodution of the agent will be f(min[1, 1]) or f(1) sine the agent and partner both have one
unit of resoure. Hene the expeted reward will be∑
g
(.5)(.5)(.5)u (cgf(min[1, 1])) .
This reasoning uses only the proportionality onditions on the mathing and the distribution of wealth. It does not
use the expliit nature of the mathing sheme. However, the argument ontains a gap. We give the orret expression
for expeted per period reward below and show that it depends expliitly on the distribution plaed on the set of
bilateral mathes, and annot be omputed if we only know the proportionality ondition satised by the probability
distribution on mathes.
Let Q denote a probability distribution on the set of bilateral mathes of the 2N agents that satises the following
proportionality ondition. The probability that any given agent meets a type a agent is .5 and the the probability
that she meets a type b agent is also .5. Let Q(ϕ) denote the probability of math ϕ. The total expeted reward
(utility of onsumption) for a period is
R (k, c) =
∑
g
∑
ϕ
Q(ϕ)u (cg(t)Fg (k, ϕ)) .
Here we see the expliit dependene on the distribution Q. We have a orresponding expression for the transition
probabilities.
Pkk˜(c) = Q(ϕ) if k˜g = kg + Fg (k, ϕ)− cgFg (k, ϕ) .
Again, we emphasize that these quantities annot be omputed without expliit knowledge of the mathing distribution.
We give two examples below of distributions that satisfy the same proportionality ondition, but give distint expeted
rewards, transition probabilities, and onsequently distint optimal poliies.
We rst desribe two distint probability distributions on the set of bilateral mathes of agents in our model eonomy.
We want to onsider a spei example so we take N = 4 with four type a agents and four type b agents. There
are 7 ∗ 5 ∗ 3 or 105 possible bilateral mathes of the eight agents. The two distributions are desribed by tables
listing the bilateral math and orresponding probability. Mathes that do not appear are assigned probability 0. The
lexiographi representation is used to speify mathes.
Distribution I
Math Probability
(a1, a2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4)(b1, b2) .5
(a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, a4)(b3, b4) .5
Distribution II
Math Probability
(a1, a2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4)(b1, b2) .25
(a1, a2)(a3, b1)(a4, b2)(b3, b4) .25
(a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, a4)(b3, b4) .25
(a1, b3)(a2, b4)(a3, a4)(b1, b2) .25
Note that both distributions satisfy the proportionality ondition, M2, sine any individual agent has probability .5
of being mathed with a type a agent and probability .5 of being mathed with a type b agent. Both distributions
also satisfy the quasi-independene ondition, M3, sine for eah listed math, exatly one-half of the a agents are
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mathed with type a agents and one-half are mathed with type b agents. Condition M1 is trivially satised in
this ase, so both distributions satisfy the Proportionality Laws.
Next we assign initial apital to the agents. We assign the distribution of apital so that eah agent has either 0 or
1 unit, and the probability (using the disrete uniform distribution on the set of agents) that a type a agent has 1
unit is .5. A table gives the distribution of apital.
Initial Distribution of Capital
Agent a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4
Capital 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Now onsider the problem of seleting the onsumption - investment behavior of the set of agents to maximize total
disounted expeted utility of onsumption over an innite time horizon.
In the ase of Distribution I there is nothing to be done. For both mathes, either two agents of the same type
are paired or a pair involves one agent with 0 apital. Therefore the distribution of apital does not hange from one
period to the next. The optimal (maximum) total utility of onsumption over the innite time horizon is 0.
In the ase of Distribution II, if one of the rst three distributions is realized during the rst period, no prodution
takes plae beause two agents of the same type meet or agents of opposite type meet but one of them has 0 apital.
However if the fourth math is realized (and this ours with probability .25) then agents a1, a2, b3, and b4 all produe
an amount f (min[1, 1]) = f(1). Therefore, if we take cg to be positive for all agents g, total expeted utility of
onsumption over the innite time horizon will be positive in ontrast to the zero optimal utility of onsumption we
see in the ase of Distribution I.
Sine the expeted reward, transition probabilities, total disounted utility, and Bellman equation depend expliitly
on the probability distribution on the set of mathes, it should be lear that the qualitative properties of this growth
model are robust when random mathing is used as a shok. Indeed, one an obtain similar results for models with
arbitrarily large sets of agents and for models with innitely many agents (ountable or unountable) and dierent
reward strutures. Even if the mathing sheme satises an independene ondition on types, the non-uniqueness of
the probability distribution allows one to onstrut simple and natural examples suh that optimal poliies depend on
the expliit nature of the mathing probability distribution. It should also be lear that this behavior does not depend
on our hoie of prodution funtion.
6. No Aggregate Unertainty
In the previous setion we saw that the expeted aggregate reward and transition probabilities will depend on the
spei nature of a random mathing sheme even when the mathing sheme satises a proportionality ondition with
respet to types. This naturally leads to the following question. When is it possible to ompute expeted aggregate
rewards and transition probabilities for a mathing sheme if we only know that the sheme satises the proportionality
onditions? In other words, when will a model that uses random mathing (that satises proportionality) as shok be
well dened?
This question an be posed in terms of aggregate unertainty. We have seen that simply stipulating that the
mathing sheme satisfy a proportionality ondition does not eliminate aggregate unertainty in an eonomi model.
For the seond model of the last setion (Distribution II), the aggregate reward is stohasti at eah stage. In general,
the aggregate expeted reward may remain stohasti even if the mathing sheme satises the Proportionality Laws.
We would like to know onditions under whih the aggregate unertainty disappears and expeted rewards for the
population an be omputed stritly in terms of the proportion of eah type in the population. It turns out that the
answer to this question does not depend on the ardinality of the set of agents, but rather on the reward struture. The
same observation holds for the transition struture. Models with nite, ountably innite, or a ontinuum of agents
will have the no aggregate unertainty property if the reward and transition strutures for individual agents depends
only on types. If the reward or transition struture depends on properties of agents other than types, then aggregate
unertainty may persist regardless of the ardinality of the set of agents of the model.
Suppose that the reward of an individual agent depends only upon the agent's type, the type of the agent's partner
under a math, and some ontrol parameter c. Preisely, we assume
Rg (τ, c, ϕ) = f (τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c) .
Remark 6.1. This an be aomplished in our example from the previous setion by redening types to inlude the
amount of money held by an agent. One would then have four types that ould be denoted (a, 0), (a, 1), (b, 0), and
(b, 1). Alternatively, if all agents within a type had idential apital endowments, the reward struture would depend
only on type. If one allows a ontinuous distribution of money, it is impossible to desribe the possible states of
individual agents with a nite set of types.
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We show that under this assumption aggregate unertainty disappears from the reward struture if the mathing
sheme satises the proportionality ondition with respet to types. First onsider the ase of nitely many agents
with ounting measure on the agent set, so µ(A) = N .
Assume the eonomy onsists of nitely many types as before. Let S = {τ1, τ2, τ3, · · · , τL} denote the set of types.
Assume type τk makes up the proportion Pk of the population. Assume Q is a distribution on the set of bilateral
mathes that satises the proportionality ondition with respet to types, so we are assuming that
Q {ϕ |τ(ϕ(g)) = τk } = Pk.
Alternatively, this an be written as ∑
ϕ
δτkτ(ϕ(g))Q(ϕ) = Pk
where
δpq =
{
1 if p = q
0 if p 6= q
.
With the above notation, we ompute the aggregate expeted reward in terms of the proportionality onstants Pk.
Theorem 6.2. Let A be a set of N agents. Suppose Rg (τ, c, ϕ) = f (τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c) is a reward funtion that depends
only on types, a ontrol parameter, and a math of agents. Assume Q is a probability distribution on the set of bilateral
mathes that satises the proportionality ondition, M2, so that for all g ∈ A we have Q {ϕ |τ(ϕ(g)) = τk } = Pk. Then
the expeted reward for the population is deterministi and is given by
E[R(τ, c)] =
1
N
∑
g
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c)Pk
Proof. The proof is a straightforward alulation. From the denition of aggregate reward,
E[R(τ, c)] =
1
N
∑
g
∑
ϕ
Rg (τ, c, ϕ)
1
N
∑
g
∑
ϕ
f (τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c)Q(ϕ) =
(6.1)
1
N
∑
g
∑
ϕ
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c) δτkτ(ϕ(g))Q(ϕ) =
1
N
∑
g
∑
k
∑
ϕ
f (τ(g), τk, c) δτkτ(ϕ(g))Q(ϕ) =
1
N
∑
g
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c)Pk

The ase of a ountable innity of agents follows by the same argument. One replaes summation by integration
sine we shall assume a ontinuous (non-atomi) probability distribution on the set Φ of bilateral mathes. We assume
that the exhaustion of N is An = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} so µ(An) = n.
Theorem 6.3. Let Rg (τ, c, ϕ) = f(τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c) be a bounded reward funtion that depends only upon types and the
ontrol parameter c. Let Q be a ontinuous probability distribution on the the set Φ of bilateral mathes of the set N of
agents. Assume Q satises the proportionality ondition M2 so that for all g ∈ N we have Q {ϕ |τ(ϕ(g)) = τk } = Pk.
Then the expeted reward for the entire population is deterministi and is given by
E[R(τ, c)] = lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c)Pk.
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Proof. The proof follows the same argument as in the ase of nitely many agents. We rst rewrite the proportionality
ondition as ∫
χ{ϕ|τ(ϕ(g))=τk }dQ(ϕ) = Pk
whih is assumed to hold for all g ∈ N, and where χ denotes the harateristi funtion. Then
E[R(τ, c)] =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∫
Φ
f (τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c) dQ(ϕ) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∫
Φ
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c))χ{ϕ|τ(ϕ(g))=τk }dQ(ϕ) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∑
k
∫
Φ
f (τ(g), τk, c))χ{ϕ|τ(ϕ(g))=τk }dQ(ϕ) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c)
∫
Φ
χ{ϕ|τ(ϕ(g))=τk }dQ(ϕ) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
g∈An
∑
k
f (τ(g), τk, c)Pk
as laimed. 
The above results show that the aggregate unertainty disappears from the reward struture as a onsequene of
two features. First, the mathing sheme must satisfy a proportionality ondition with respet to types, and seond,
the reward funtion must depend only upon types. An independene in types ondition is not needed. Furthermore, an
innity of agents is not needed. One only needs suiently many agents so that it is possible to onstrut a mathing
sheme that satises the proportionality ondition. Clearly, from our earlier onstrution of the probability distribution
satisfying proportionality in the ase of nitely many agents, as the number of types inreases, the number of agents
needed for existene of the mathing sheme inreases.
In the ase of a ontinuum of agents a ompletely analogous result holds. In this ase one has for expeted reward
E[R(τ, c)] =∫
A×
∫
Φ
f (τ(g), τ(ϕ(g)), c)) dµ(g)× dQ(ϕ).
At this point one must impose some additional onditions on the set of mathes and the funtion f . First the bilateral
mathes ϕ must be measurable with respet to the measure spae (A,L, µ). If the measure µ is not nite, additional
onditions will be needed on f to get onvergene. For the mathing shemes onstruted by Alo´s-Ferrer in [4℄, this is
not a problem sine the mathes are onstruted to be measurable and µ is nite. For some mathing shemes, suh as
those onstruted by Due and Sun [10℄, the produt measure must be modied in an appropriate way so the integral
makes sense.
The important point in this setion is that aggregate unertainty in the reward struture disappears if the rewards
depend only on type and the ontrol, and if the random mathing struture satises the proportionality ondition of
the Proportionality Laws. Similar onditions will make the transition struture deterministi in the aggregate. Sine
the arguments follow along the same lines as those for the reward struture, we do not present them here.
7. The Entropy of a Random Mathing Sheme
For a typial eonomi model that uses random mathing to introdue unertainty, very little is typially assumed
about the mathing sheme. Similarly, many models seek to impose minimal assumptions on how types and other
properties are assigned to agents. Therefore one is faed with the problem of dening reasonable probability distribu-
tions on the set of mathes onsistent with some minimal onditions on the distribution. In the last setion we showed
that if one is willing to restrit the reward and transition struture of the model to depend upon a set of types and the
random mathing struture satises proportionality laws given in terms of the types, then the model is well dened
and deterministi in the aggregate.
Now suppose that the reward struture or transition struture depends on state parameters of the individuals in
the population beyond the types speied in the mathing struture. One is faed with a non-uniqueness problem that
an make a model ill posed as our examples showed. In general, there are many distributions ompatible with some
desired properties, and we need a method that will selet one of them.
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If we have no reason or information to prefer one random event over another, then the distribution we use to measure
the likelihood of the events should reet this lak of information. The entropy of a distribution measures in some
sense the information ontained in the distribution - the less information we have the higher the entropy. We rst
review some needed denitions and results on entropy, and then apply the results to the random mathing problem.
Remark 7.1. In the remainder of this setion, we do not assume our probability distributions on mathes neessarily
satisfy the Proportionality Laws. The point here is to develop a method of making mathing models well dened in
ases where the rewards and transition probabilities depend upon state variables other than type.
7.1. Information Entropy. The idea of using entropy as a measure of information enoded in a distribution goes
bak to Shannon [20℄. An exellent review of the topi and basi properties an be found in [14℄.
Denition 7.2. Let X be a disrete random variable on a probability spae suh that
P{X = xk} = pk
for all xk in the image of X . The Shannon entropy of the distribution is
H(X) = −
∑
pk log(pk)
where log means natural logarithm.
We have a similar denition in ase X is a ontinuous random variable.
Denition 7.3. Let X be a ontinuous real valued random variable with probability density funtion f . Then the
dierential entropy of X is
H(X) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x) log[f(x)]dx.
The following result demonstrates the link between maximal entropy and minimal information. If X is a random
variable taking on a nite set of values, and we have no reason to prefer one value over another, then it is most
appropriate to assign equal probability to eah possible outome. This an be stated in terms of entropy as follows.
If Ω is a nite disrete probability spae, then the distribution that maximizes the entropy is the uniform disrete
distribution.
The disrete uniform distribution maximizes entropy if no onstraints are imposed on the probability distribution.
Hene, the more or less standard assumption that we should take all possible mathes (of nitely many agents) as
equally likely in the absene of additional information, is onsistent with taking the distribution of maximum entropy.
The Dierential Entropy is not as satisfatory a measure of information as the Shannon entropy and it annot
be realized as a limiting ase of the Shannon entropy. However, the dierential entropy still does give us some
measure of information and both the uniform distribution on the unit interval and the usual normal distribution an
be haraterized in terms of the dierential entropy. For example, the normal distribution is the unique maximal
(dierential) entropy distribution with nite mean and variane.
The Proportionality Laws an be interpreted as information about a random mathing sheme, and imply onstraints
on the probability distribution on the set of mathes. Thus, from the set of all probability distributions satisfying a
set of onstraints, the distribution with maximal entropy appears to be a natural andidate. Indeed, if we selet a
distribution of lower entropy, we are assuming information we do not have.
We next show that the maximal entropy distribution for distributions on the set of bilateral mathes of a nite set
of agents that satisfy the proportionality ondition is unique.
Theorem 7.4. Let A be a nite set of agents, S = {τ1, τ2, ..., τL} be a nite set of types, and let τ : A → S be an
assignment of types. Let Φ be the set of bilateral mathes of A. Suppose P1, P2, ..., PL are positive real numbers suh
that
∑
Pl = 1. Let P be the set of probability distributions on Φ that satisfy the proportionality ondition M2. If Q ∈P
has maximal entropy, then Q is unique.
Proof. We have already noted that the Proportionality Laws dene P as a bounded onvex polyhedra in the real vetor
spae of dimension ardΦ. (In fat this onvex polyhedra lies in an ane subspae of muh smaller dimension.) Now
suppose, by way of ontradition, that Q and Q˜ are two distint probability distributions in P and they have maximal
entropy. Then, by the onvexity of P , the distribution tQ+ (1− t)Q˜ is in P for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. The entropy of the onvex
ombination of distributions, denoted E(t), is
E(t) = H(tQ+ (1− t)Q˜) = −
∑
(tqk + (1− t)q˜k)log(tqk + (1− t)q˜k).
Compute the rst and seond derivatives with respet to t of the terms in the sum. We get
E′(t) = −
∑
(qk − q˜k)[1 + log(t(qk − q˜k) + q˜k)]
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E′′(t) = −
∑ (qk − q˜k)2
tqk + (1− t)q˜k
If E(0) = E(1), so the entropy of Q and Q˜ are equal, then by the strit negativity of the seond derivative of E(t) in
ase Q is not identially equal to Q˜, we see that we annot have H(Q) = H(Q˜) with H(Q) and H(Q˜) maximal. Hene
the maximal entropy distribution is unique. 
Although the following example is quite simple, it illustrates a method that an be used to hek if a distribution
satisfying a proportionality ondition is maximal or not.
Example 7.5. Consider the mathing problem for four agents, {1, 2, 3, 4} of two types, {a, b}. Suppose agent 1 and
2 eah have type ”a′′ and agents 3 and 4 have type ”b′′. With four agents, there are three distint bilateral mathes.
We name the math orresponding to the given representation and orresponding probability in the table below.
Math Representation Probability
ϕ1 (1, 2)(3, 4) p1
ϕ2 (1, 3)(2, 4) p2
ϕ3 (1, 4)(2, 3) p3
Let Q1 be the distribution that assigns values p1 = .5, p2 = .5, and p3 = 0. Let Q2 be the distribution that assigns
values p1 = .5, p2 = 0, and p3 = .5. Both of these distributions have the property that the probability that any given
agent is mathed to a type ”a′′ agent is .5 and the probability that the agent is mathed to a type ”b′′ agent is also .5.
Note that interhanging agents 3 and 4 in math ϕ2 gives math ϕ3. Sine agents 3 and 4 both have the same type,
type ”b′′, a maximal entropy distribution that satises the proportionality ondition should assign the same probability
to two distint mathes that an be obtained from one another by an interhange of agents of the same type. Therefore,
neither distribution Q1 nor Q2 an have maximal entropy.
We now formulate the maximal entropy problem for this example. Let Qmax denote the maximal entropy distribu-
tion. Then Qmax is determined by solving the following maximization problem.
Maximize E = −
∑3
k=1 pk log(pk) subjet to
p1 = .5 p2 + p3 = .5 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1
The ondition p1 = .5 ours beause we want the proportionality ondition, M2, to be satised. So, for example the
probability that agent 1 is mathed to a type ”a′′ agent must be .5, and the probability that agent 3 is mathed to a
type ”b′′ agent must be .5. This only ours for math ϕ1. The ondition p1 = .5 then implies the seond ondition,
p2 + p3 = .5 sine we want a probability measure on the set of mathes.
It is easy to solve this onvex optimization problem and the solution is p1 = .5 and p2 = p3 = .25. Hene, we
see that the two mathes ϕ2 and ϕ3 that an be obtained from one another by interhanging agents 3 and 4 (or by
interhanging 1 and 2) have the same probability.
Remark 7.6. In the above example ondition M3 is not satised. To give an example with M2 and M3 satised we
would need a larger set of agents (eight will do). However the idea is exatly as in the above example. Imposing
ondition M3 in addition to M2 simply makes the dimension of the onvex set of distributions smaller than it would
be with ondition M2 alone.
7.2. Dierential Entropy. For random mathing shemes for nite sets of agents, a unique distribution of maximal
entropy always exists. (If the random mathing sheme satises the Proportionality Laws, a unique maximal entropy
distribution exists as well.) This is not the ase for ontinuous distributions and the Dierential Entropy. In fat, we
show below that in the ase of bilateral mathes of a ountably innite set of agents, there is no maximal entropy
distribution.
Theorem 7.7. Let A = N, the set of natural numbers, and let Φ be the set of bilateral mathes of A. Identify Φ
with the nonnegative real numbers, [0,∞) through the bijetion given by Corollary 4.10. Then there is no ontinuous
probability distribution on Φ of maximal entropy.
Proof. A straightforward alulation, using the denition of the Dierential Entropy, shows that the exponential
distribution with density funtion
f(x) =
{ 1
µ
exp(− x
µ
) if x ≥ 0
0 otherwise
has entropy
H(f) = logµ
Sine we an take µ arbitrarily large, there is no distribution of maximal entropy. 
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The above result shows that in the ase of innitely many agents, one will need to plae additional restritions on
the set of probability distributions on Φ in order to get a unique maximal entropy distribution. One suh ondition
is evident from the above result. If we simply speify the mean of the distribution, then there is a unique maximal
entropy distribution on [0,∞) with the given mean. However, speifying the mean is not really satisfatory from the
point of view of bilateral mathing sine there is no obvious natural relationship between the mean and properties of
the mathing sheme.
We an obtain a positive uniqueness result using the Dierential Entropy for bilateral mathing of ountably innite
sets of agents when the distribution satises a proportionality ondition and the distribution omes from a lass for
whih the entropy is bounded. More work needs to be done in this diretion.
8. Conlusions
In this paper, we have examined some of the issues posed by the non-uniqueness of random mathing shemes
that satisfy onditions typially found in eonomi models. We took a general approah sine these problems our
regardless of the ardinality of set of agents in the model. We onentrated on sequential models in disrete time sine
they are ommonly used in many areas of eonomis.
Random mathing shemes are frequently assumed to satisfy a set of Proportionality Laws that involves the type
of an agent. The type an be onsidered to be a omponent of the state variable for the agent and in some ases it
may be the only omponent of the state of an agent. The motivation for the assumption that the random mathing
sheme satisfy the Proportionality Laws is so that the model ontains no aggregate unertainty. In other words, the
aggregate behavior of the system is deterministi.
We showed with a simple example that if the reward or transition struture of the sequential model depends on state
omponents other than the type of an agent, then the Proportionality Laws will not in general eliminate aggregate
unertainty from the model. This is essentially a onsequene of the non-uniqueness of random mathing shemes that
satisfy the Proportionality Laws. We onstruted an example to show that if one only postulates a random mathing
sheme that satises the Proportionality Laws without expliitly speifying the probability distribution, the model
may not be well dened.
One way to deal with the lak of uniqueness for random mathing shemes is to assume that the state of an agent
is ompletely determined by the type of an agent. In our growth model example, one ould inorporate the apital
holding of an agent into the type. This approah may well lead to additional ompliations if the number of types
beomes innite.
One should not be surprised by these results sine they are entirely onsistent with eonomi reality. It is easy to
purhase automotive liability insurane, but diult to purhase terrorist insurane. The proportion of terrorists in
the general population is most likely quite small, and thus our hane enounter with a terrorist orrespondingly small.
However, our reward (ost) funtion for a math with a terrorist will depend on state variables other than type. For
example, the ost will likely depend upon some state of the terrorist's mentality at the time of the math.
In some ases it may be undesirable or impossible to dene the state variable of an agent in terms of type alone. In
suh ases, to pin down the model, one must expliitly selet a random mathing distribution from the many that are
available. The seletion should be onsistent with the information available. We showed that the entropy of a random
mathing distribution an be used to make the seletion in the ase of nite sets of agents. In the ase of innite sets
of agents this approah is problemati sine maximal entropy distributions may not exist. Additional onstraints on
the random mathing distribution will generally be needed to guarantee a maximal dierential entropy distribution,
and more work is needed in this diretion.
Finally, we believe that espeially in ases where a unique random mathing sheme annot be obtained in a natural
way, it may be more appropriate to regard the mathing distribution as a ontrol variable for a sequential deision
model. In the ase of sequential deision optimality problems, this an be a diult but very interesting problem.
We performed omputer simulations on models similar to the ones presented in Setion 5, and found very subtle
relationships between the mathing distribution, the reward struture, and optimal solutions. In some ases, inreasing
the entropy of the mathing sheme resulted in lower expeted aggregate reward, and in other ases the situation was
reversed. The identiation of a more systemati relationship between random mathing tehnologies and eieny of
alloations is left for further researh.
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